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Quantum games and social norms. The
quantum ultimatum game
R. Vilela Mendes∗†
Abstract
The noncooperative Nash equilibrium solution of classical games
corresponds to a rational expectations attitude on the part of the
players. However, in many cases, games played by human players
have outcomes very different from Nash equilibria.
A restricted version of quantum games is proposed to implement,
in mathematical games, the interplay of self-interest and internalized
social norms that rules human behavior.
Keywords: Quantum games, Social norms, Ultimatum
Classical game theory is a mathematical framework for decision problems
with rational rules and rational players. It is used in many situations in
economics, social sciences and communication. An important item, leading
to a solution, is the notion of noncooperative Nash equilibrium x∗,
x∗Px∗ ≥ xPx∗
P being the payoff matrix and x and x∗ mixed strategy vectors. It means
that x∗ is an ideal strategy when played against itself or that no player can
improve his payoff by changing his strategy, when the strategies of the other
players are fixed.
The Nash equilibrium solutions correspond to the purely self-interested
attitude where, given any environment situation, each player tries to max-
imize his gains regardless of what happens to the other players. It is the
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rational expectations attitude of what has been called the Homo oeconomi-
cus, a notion which is at the basis of many theoretical economics constructs.
It is therefore important to check the applicability of such notion in human
societies. Experiments have been carried out and the problem is that in
many cases, when played by human players, games have outcomes very dif-
ferent from the Nash equilibrium points. An interesting case is the ultimatum
game[1]. A simplified version of this game is the following:
One of the players (the proposer) receives 100 coins which he is told to
divide into two non-zero parts, one for himself and the other for the other
player (the responder). If the responder accepts the split, it is implemented.
If the responder refuses, nothing is given to the players. Consider, for exam-
ple, a simple payoff matrix corresponding to two different proposer offers
R0 R1
P0
|00〉
a, c
|01〉
0, 0
P1
|10〉
b, b
|11〉
0, 0
(1)
with a ≫ c, a + c = 2b (for example a = 99, c = 1, b = 50). For future
reference the players moves are labelled |··〉.
It is clear that the unique Nash equilibrium is |00〉, corresponding to the
greedy proposal (a, c). However, when the game is played with human play-
ers, such greedy proposals are most often refused, even in one-shot games
where the responder has no material or strategic advantage in refusing the
offer. Based on this and similar results in other situations (public goods
games, etc), Bowles and Gintis[2] [3] developed the notion of strong reci-
procity (Homo reciprocans [4]) as a better model for human behavior. Homo
reciprocans would come to social situations with a propensity to cooperate
and share but would respond to selfish behavior on the part of others by
retaliating , even at a cost to himself and even when he could not expect any
future personal gains from such actions.
Going a step further, the same authors in collaboration with a group of
anthropologists conducted a very interesting “ultimatum game experiment”
in many small-scale societies around the world[5]. Consistently different re-
sults are obtained in different societies and the authors conclude that Homo
oeconomicus is rejected in all cases, the players’ behavior being strongly cor-
related with existing social norms and market structure in their societies.
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Apparently human decision problems involve a mixture of self-interest and a
background of (internalized) social norms.
But how does one code for social norms in mathematical games? It is
here that quantum games (or a restricted version thereof) may be of help. In
a full quantum game[6] the players have at their disposal an Hilbert space of
strategies rather than a discrete set (or a simplex in the case of mixed strate-
gies). In practical terms one considers an initial vector in the tensor product
space of moves and then each player can act on his part of the space by ar-
bitrary unitary operations. In a restricted quantum game (RQG) version[7],
the initial state is again an arbitrary vector but the players operations are
restricted to classical moves, that is, to permutations of their basis states.
The restricted version is probably the most appropriate for human deci-
sion problems, because it is not clear how to interpret general unitary op-
erations in terms of human decisions. On the other hand the choice of the
initial state might be a useful tool to code for the background of social norms
on which classical human moves take place.
For the simplified ultimatum example corresponding to the payoff matrix
(1) the Hilbert space is spanned by {|00〉 , |01〉 , |10〉 , |11〉}, a general initial
state is
φ = c00 |00〉+ c01 |01〉+ c10 |10〉+ c11 |11〉 (2)
with |c00|2+ |c01|2+ |c10|2+ |c11|2 = 1 and the (classical) players moves are the
matrices M0 =
(
1 0
0 1
)
and M1 =
(
1 0
0 1
)
or probabilistic combinations
thereof for mixed strategies.
If the initial φ state is a factorized one, the outcome is the same as in
the classical game but not if it is an entangled state. It is easy to interpret
this effect. It means that when some action is taken (for example a purely
selfish action) in one of the components of the entangled state that will affect
the other components as well and the resulting payoff. Individual decisions
have entangled consequences and the entanglement is defined by the social
environment norms, which in mathematical terms corresponds to the choice
of the φ state.
With the general initial state in (2) the game becomes equivalent to a
three-parameter family of classical games with payoffs
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R0 R1
P0 a |c11|2 + b |c01|2 , c |c11|2 + b |c01|2 a |c10|2 + b |c00|2 , c |c10|2 + b |c00|2
P1 b |c11|2 + a |c01|2 , b |c11|2 + c |c01|2 b |c10|2 + a |c00|2 , b |c10|2 + c |c00|2
(3)
Each member of the family must have at least a Nash equilibrium in pure
or mixed strategies. Let (µ, 1− µ) and (ν, 1− ν) be the probabilities for
proposer and responder to use moves M0 and M1. Then, their payoffs are,
respectively
PP = µ (a− b)
{
ν
(|c11|2 − |c01|2)+ (1− ν) (|c10|2 − |c00|2)}+ f (ν)
PR = ν
(|c11|2 − |c10|2) (µc+ (1− µ) b) + ν (|c01|2 − |c00|2) (µb+ (1− µ) c) + g (µ)
(4)
with f (ν) = νb
(|c11|2 − |c10|2) + νa (|c01|2 − |c00|2) + b |c10|2 + a |c00|2 and
g (µ) = µ (c− b) (|c10|2 − |c00|2)+ b |c10|2 + c |c00|2
From (3) one sees that the game is invariant for the replacements (c11 ↔ c01, c10 ↔ c00)
or (c11 ↔ c10, c01 ↔ c00) and has two different classes of Nash equilibria.
(i) If |c11|2− |c01|2 and |c10|2− |c00|2 are both ≥ 0 or ≤ 0 , because of the
symmetry one may choose |c11|2 ≥ |c01|2 and |c10|2 ≥ |c00|2. Then, a Nash
equilibrium is obtained for µ = 1 and also for a pure responder strategy
ν = 1 or 0 depending on the sign of νc
(|c11|2 − |c10|2) + νb (|c01|2 − |c00|2).
The payoff of the responder is the largest of c |c11|2+b |c01|2 or c |c10|2+b |c00|2
with corresponding proposer payoffs a |c11|2 + b |c01|2 or a |c10|2 + b |c00|2.
An example in this class is
φ =
1√
2
{|11〉+ |01〉} (5)
for which the Nash equilibrium payoffs are
PP =
1
2
(a+ b)
PR =
1
2
(c+ b)
(6)
(ii) If |c11|2−|c01|2 and |c10|2−|c00|2 have opposite signs, choosing |c11|2 ≥
|c01|2 and |c10|2 ≤ |c00|2 the strategy of the proposer now depends on ν and
Nash equilibria are obtained for pure or mixed strategies depending on the
values of the coefficients. An example is
φ =
1√
2
{|11〉+ |00〉} (7)
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which has a Nash equilibrium for the mixed strategy µ = ν = 1
2
and payoffs
PP =
1
4
(a+ b)
PR =
1
4
(c+ b)
A even wider range of possibilities and payoff structures may be simply
obtained by increasing the number of possible proposer moves in the original
payoff matrix.
In conclusion: One sees that the restricted quantum game (RQG) struc-
ture, while keeping the rational self-interest choice characteristic of the Nash
equilibria, does so in a background that allows for the coding of social norms.
This occurs because of the entangled nature of the φ state.
As shown, a RQG is equivalent to a family of classical games. Therefore
one might code social norms (as well as player contracts) directly on the
family of classical games without any reference to quantum games. Never-
theless the coding of non-trivial members of the family by a simple choice
of an entangled φ vector seems to be an useful compact way to characterize
such families.
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